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Under some [state] constitutions the judges are elected
and subject to frequent reelection. I venture to predict
that sooner or later these innovations will have dire resuits and that one day it will be seen that by diminishing
the magistrates' independence, not judicial power only
but the democratic republic itself has been attacked.
-Alexis

de Tocqueville'
I.

INTRODUCTION

Some might say that Alexis de Tocqueville's insightful prediction
has finally come true. Spending in judicial campaigns has, and continues
to, increase at an exponential rate. As competition and special interest
group participation increases, judicial elections are getting "noisier, nasI

ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 269 (J.P. Mayer ed. & George

Lawrence trans., Harper & Row 1969) (1835).

2002]

THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

tier and costlier."'2 Together, these circumstances are severely undermin3
ing the moral authority of the courts.
The increasing flow of money into judicial campaigns is staggering.
In 2000, candidates spent more than $45 million on state supreme court
campaigns - a 61% increase from 1998. 4 This enormous sum was in
addition to the millions of dollars spent on "issue" advertising by various
interest groups. For instance, interest groups spent $8.7 million on campaign advertisements for two seats on the Ohio Supreme Court in 2000,
while the five candidates together spent another $3.3 million.5 In Michigan, a contentious race for three supreme court seats cost at least $16
7
million. 6 Experts already predict costly judicial elections in 2002.
The tone of judicial elections also has substantially deteriorated. In
2000, a Michigan GOP television ad attacked a court of appeals judge for
upholding a light sentence for a pedophile - with the word "pedophile"
in huge type flashed close to the judge's name, while the Michigan Democratic Party featured an ad that declared that incumbent justices had
'ruled against families and for corporations 82% of the time' - a claim
'8
the Detroit Free Press observed "borders on bogus."
In a 2001 California election, a challenger who served as a public
defender was characterized as someone "who cares about the rights of
violent criminals," and was attacked by a sitting judge for representing a
"cop killer," a "child molester," and an "armed robber."9
Given these disturbing developments, it should come as no surprise
that surveys consistently show that an overwhelming majority of the pub2 David B. Rottman & Roy A. Schotland, What Makes Judicial Elections Unique?, 34
Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1369, 1373 n.5 (2001) (quoting Richard Woodbury, Is Texas Justice For
Sale?, TIME, Jan. 11, 1988, at 74).
3 See Hon. Hugh Maddox, Taking Politics Out of Judicial Elections, 23 AM. J. TRIAL
ADVOC. 329, 335 (1999) (stating that failure to address the problems of judicial elections has

"caused a dangerous decline in the public's faith in impartiality of the judicial branch of government" in Alabama); Nancy Perry Graham, The Best Judges Money Can Buy,' GEORGE,
December/January 2001, at 74 (asserting that "[b]usinesses, unions, and lawyers are pouring
millions into state supreme court races-and may walk off with the judicial system's

integrity.").
4 See Neil A. Lewis, Gifts in State JudicialRaces Are Up Sharply, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14,
2002, at A27.
5 See ILL. STATE BD. OF ELECTIONS, MONEY AND ELECTIONS IN ILLINOIS 2000, at 7, 11
(2001).
6 See William Glaberson, States Taking Steps to Rein in Excesses of JudicialPoliticking, N.Y. TIMES, June 15, 2001, at Al.
7 See, e.g., Pete Slover, Pricey Battles Predicted in Judicial Races: Democrats to Challenge GOP's Grip on Supreme, Criminal Appeals Courts, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Jan. 3,
2002 (reporting competition for several seats on the Texas Supreme Court).
8 Thomas A. Gottschalk, Justice Reform - To What End? By What Means?, 9 METROPOLITAN CORP. COUNS., No. 11, at 1, 6-8 (Nov. 2001) (quoting Roy Schotland, Financing
Judicial Elections, 2000: Change and Challenge (2001) (unpublished)).
9 Mark Hansen, When Is Speech Too Free?, 87 A.B.A. J. 20 (May 2001).
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lic believe that many state courts are influenced by money and politics.
For example, a recent national poll found that 81 percent of Americans
believe that judges are influenced by campaign contributions and politics. Surveys in several states yield similarly disturbing results.' Even
court personnel, attorneys, and judges share this belief.' 2
Campaign finance reform and tinkering with judicial codes of conduct to regulate speech in judicial campaigns do not offer a comprehensive solution to the systemic problems inherent in judicial elections.
Such changes not only face significant constitutional hurdles, but also
come with their own set of problems.
Appointive judicial selection systems may provide the best remedy
for the damage elections are causing to the state judicial system. Appointive systems are not subject to the problems inherent to an elected
judiciary: the appearance of impropriety caused by judges taking money
from those who appear before them, the threat to judicial independence
resulting from a judge's dependence on campaign contributions and
party support, the reduced perception of impartiality caused by statements of judicial candidates on political or social issues, the elimination
of qualified lawyers who would otherwise be willing to serve as jurists,
and the loss of public confidence caused by the vile rhetoric of judicial
campaigns. Moreover, there are numerous appointive systems currently
in use that states can draw upon to formulate their own plans. These
factors all help to explain why momentum is building in this country for
adoption of appointive judicial selection systems.
This article will discuss the problematic state of elective systems,
including the flow of money and unhealthy rhetoric in recent judicial
campaigns. The article then reviews recent surveys evaluating the impact of judicial campaigns on public confidence in the courts. Next, the
article demonstrates why elections are incompatible with proper judicial
function. The article also provides some alternatives for states seeking to
move from an elected to an appointive system. The article concludes
that the goal of a truly independent judiciary requires states to adopt an
appointive system for selecting state court judges.

10 Anthony Champagne, Interest Groups and Judicial Elections, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1391, 1407-08 (2001). State polls have produced similar results. Eighty-three percent of Texans, 88% of Pennsylvanians, and 90% of Ohioans also believe that campaign contributions
influence judges' decisions. Charles Gardner Geyh, Publicly Financed Judicial Elections: An
Overview, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1467, 1470-71 (2001).
11 See, e.g., Geyh, supra note 10, at 1470-7 1; see also Champagne, supra note 10, at
1407-08.
12 See Geyh, supra note 10, at 1470-71 (discussing findings of a 1998 survey sponsored
by the Texas Supreme Court).
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JUDICIAL ELECTIONS CREATE SERIOUS PROBLEMS

A majority of states currently use some form of election for selecting their judges at the appellate or trial level.13 Fourteen states elect their
judges at some level through partisan elections.1 4 Eighteen states use a
nonpartisan election system. 15 Overall, approximately 34% of state court
judges obtained their initial term through a partisan election and 14%
6
obtained their initial terms through a nonpartisan election.1
Whether partisan or nonpartisan, judicial elections create serious
problems.17 As this article will show, elections threaten judicial independence by pressuring judges to follow the will of the majority, which may
run counter to the rule of law. The public's confidence in the judiciary
also suffers as tremendous sums of money are poured into state judicial
campaigns and political mud-slinging becomes commonplace. Furthermore, elections may cause qualified candidates to shy away from office,
or may result in their removal from office, for reasons irrelevant to the
person's ability to thoughtfully apply the law in a fair and impartial
manner.
Overall, the role of the judiciary is fundamentally at odds with the
practical implications of elective politics. As former Pennsylvania Governor (now Director of the United States Office of Homeland Security)
Tom Ridge recently said in accepting the American Bar Association's
John Marshall Award: "The restraint, temperament and detachment that
we rightly demand from our judges is fundamentally incongruous with
13 See Appendix A.
14 States using partisan elections include Alabama, Illinois, Indiana (certain trial courts),
Kansas (certain trial courts), Louisiana, Michigan (nominated at party conventions, but affiliation does not appear on general election ballot), Missouri (certain trial courts), New Mexico
(after initial gubernatorial appointment), New York (trial courts), North Carolina, Ohio (partisan primary only), Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. See id.
15 States using nonpartisan elections include Arizona (certain trial court judges), Arkansas, California (trial court), Florida (trial court), Georgia, Idaho, Indiana (certain trial courts),
Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, Nevada, North Dakota, Oregon, South
Dakota (trial court), Washington, and Wisconsin. See id:
16 See U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, STATE COURT ORGANIZA-

TION 1998, NCJ 178932, at 19 (2000).
17 Some commentators argue that nonpartisan elections are inferior to partisan elections
because they are subject to all the vices of partisan elections, but not their virtues. See generally PHILIP L. DUiOis, FROM BALLOT TO BENCH (1980) (providing an empirical study of several state supreme courts demonstrating that party membership reliably correlates with judicial
behavior); see also Brent N. Bateman, Partisanshipon the Michigan Supreme Court: The
Searchfor a Reliable Predictorof JudicialBehavior, 45 WAYNE L. REV. 357 (1999) (adopting
Dubois's conclusion and advocating for change from nonpartisan to partisan elections in Michigan). Contested nonpartisan races can be as expensive and cutthroat as partisan elections and
still subject the judiciary to majoritarian influence. Nonpartisan elections, however, provide
less information for the voter by removing a label that provides a helpful indication of a
judge's philosophy in a campaign otherwise void of information. See id. For a discussion of
the reasons for the lack of information in judicial elections, see infra section II. D.
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partisan, statewide political campaigns. In my opinion, campaigning is
8
precisely the wrong thing to ask our judges to do!"'
A.

POPULAR ELECTION OF JUDGES THREATENS JUDICIAL
INDEPENDENCE AND IMPARTIALITY

Judicial candidates who are subject to popular election, and reelection, face substantial threats to their independence and impartiality. As
the need to raise large amounts of money to fund elections escalates,
candidates must seek the support of those who appear before them,
namely, lawyers and litigants. Elected judges may feel pressured to reward. their supporters or be tempted to rule against those who do not
support them. Likewise, the growing involvement of special interest
groups in judicial campaigns may pressure a candidate to adopt the political or social agenda that arrives tied to a stack of cash. Candidates who
are elected along party lines may also feel the need to be responsive to
the party establishment in order to obtain and retain their position. These
characteristics of judicial elections substantially impede both judicial independence and impartiality.
1. Rising Campaign Expenditures Place a Heavy Burden on
State Court Judges
The enormous sums spent in the 2000 judicial elections do not represent an aberration, rather, they demonstrate a nationwide trend that
has progressed undisturbed over the past twenty years. For example,
over the past decade, the cost of running a supreme court race in Alabama increased from approximately $237,000 to $2 million. 19 In Ohio,
the cost of a campaign for the Chief Justice's seat increased from
$100,000 in 1980 to $2.7 million in 1986.20 In Pennsylvania, the cost of
the average supreme court race increased from $523,000 in 1987 to $2.8
million in 1995.21 In 1986, with five seats up for election, candidates for
the North Carolina Supreme Court spent a total of $368,000.22 Eight
years later, with only two seats up for election, candidates spent nearly
$600,000. Comparable spending increases have occurred in races for
18 Governor Tom Ridge, Address, American Bar Association's John Marshall Award
(Aug. 5, 2001), at http://www.pmconline.org (last visited Feb. 15, 2002).
19 See Scott William Faulkner, Still on the Backburner: Reforming the JudicialSelection
Process, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1269, 1277 (2001); see also Hon. Pamela Willis Baschab, Putting
the Cash Cow Out to Pasture: A Call to Arms for Campaign Finance Reform in the Alabama
Judiciary,30 CUMB. L. REV. 11, 28 (1999) (discussing the impact of big money on the Alabama judiciary).
20 See Mark Hansen, A Run for the Bench, 84 A.B.A. J. 68, 69 (Oct. 1998).
21 See id.

22 See Samuel L. Grimes, Comment, "Without Favor, Denial, or Delay": Will North
CarolinaFinally Adopt the Merit Selection of Judges?, 76 N.C. L. REV. 2266, 2294 (1998).
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state trial court seats. 23 The amounts of money spent on judicial elections
strongly suggest that campaign contributors are hoping to influence a
judicial philosophy through their giving.
2.

"Begging for Campaign Contributionsfrom the Very Lawyers
Who Appear Before Them."

The threat to judicial independence, or at least the appearance
thereof, caused by the increased level of spending in judicial campaigns
is exacerbated by the fact that a substantial portion of a judge's campaign
contributions come from those who seek favorable decisions from him or
her. Unlike those running for legislative or executive office, judicial
candidates generally receive campaign contributions from a narrower set
of interests. 24 A large portion of donations to judicial campaigns is con25
tributed by parties and lawyers with cases before the court.
For example, more than 40% of the nearly $9.2 million contributed
to seven winning candidates for the Texas Supreme Court between 1994
and 1997 was contributed by parties or lawyers with cases before the
court or from contributors linked to those parties. 26 Likewise, five out of
seven members of the Illinois Supreme Court received 29% to 47% of
their contributions from lawyers.2 7 A 1995 report found that 45% of
contributions to Los Angeles County superior court races came from attorneys. 28 In 1998, the Miami Herald reported that lawyers contributed
most of the more than $5 million contributed to judicial campaigns in
29
Miami-Dade County.
There is at least some empirical evidence that the threat to judicial
impartiality caused by campaign contributions is more than mere perception - lawyer contributions may in fact influence court decisions. A
23 See Champagne, supra note 10, at 1403. For example, the median expenditure by a
candidate for the California Superior Court increased from $3,000 in 1976 to $70,000 in 1994.
Id.
24 See AM. BAR ASS'N, STANDING COMM. ON JUDICIAL INDEPENDENCE, COMM'N ON PUBLIc FINANCING OF JUDICIAL CAMPAIGNS, REPORT, at 11 (July 2001) [hereinafter ABA REPORT].
See also Rob Christensen, JudicialReform Stalls Out, THE RALEIGH NEWS & OBSERVER, Feb.
12, 1999, at A3 (explaining that "[]udges are spending more of their time begging for cam-

paign contributions from the very lawyers who appear before them.").
25 See ABA REPORT, supra note 24, at 11.
26 See id. at 14 (citing Janet Elliot, "60 Minutes" Visit Finds Court's Defenders in Hiding, TEx. LAW., Aug. 24, 1998, at 1).
27 See Jackson Williams, Irreconcilable Principles: Law, Politics, and the Illinois Supreme Court, 18 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 267, 306 (1998) ("[T]he [other] two members of the
present court ... raised no donations from lawyers and funded their campaigns mostly with

their own money.").
28 See ABA REPORT, supra note 24, at 12-13 (citing The Price of Justice: A Los Angeles
Area Case Study in Judicial Campaign Financing 67 (1995)).
29 See Scott Silverman, Merit Selection: Best System for Choosing Judges, MIAMI HERALD, July 23, 1999, at A27.
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2001 Texans for Public Justice study compared contributions by attorneys and law firms to Texas Supreme Court campaigns and the Texas
Supreme Court's rate of accepting petitions for appeal between 1994 and
1998.30 The study suggested a correlation between lawyer giving and
judicial decisionmaking. It concluded:
While the average overall petition-acceptance rate was
11 percent, this rate leapt to an astonishing 56 percent
for petitioners who contributed more than $250,000 to
the justices. In contrast, non-contributing petitioners enjoyed an acceptance rate of just 5.5 percent. For every
contribution level studied, there was a direct correlation
between the amount of money contributed and the
3
court's petition-acceptance rate. '
This report demonstrates that campaign contributions may influence justice at its most basic level - in determining whether a person will get his
or her appeal heard in court.
The damage to the judicial system is not limited to overtones of a
quid pro quo. Individual lawyers feel the pinch. While it is simple for a
randomly called member of the public to say no to a campaign volunteer
calling on behalf of a statewide candidate, it is much more difficult for a
lawyer to avoid giving to a judicial candidate, especially at the trial court
level. As one Wichita, Kansas, attorney explained:
There was no hiding from the fund raisers. They emailed you, wrote you letters, phoned you and dropped
by your office unannounced; they grabbed you in the
halls of the courthouse, slapped you on the back in restaurants during lunch, strong armed you during depositions and pounced on you at social events .... To the
lawyers being solicited, this was more than just an expensive inconvenience. Judicial elections are a
minefield for lawyers. Whatever you do in responding
to fund raising requests, you stand a good chance of offending someone you can't afford to offend; and you
will spend a small fortune doing it.32
Lawyers, and the public that employs them, should not fear losing a
case because they did not give enough money to the right candidate. The
public expects justice to be "blind," and not influenced by campaign con30 See TEXANS FOR PUB. JUST., PAY TO PLAY, at III (2001), at http://www.tpj.org/reports/

paytoplay/ (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
31 id. at V.D.
32 Steven Day, Objection, Your Honor! I Didn't Vote for You!, TomPaine.common
sense, at http://www.tompaine.com/opinion/2001/02/01/2.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2001).
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tributions. Citizens want to know that when they walk into court, they
will win or lose based solely on the merits of their case. The amount of
money spent in judicial races, however, could lead some in the public to
question whether justice in this country is for sale. This is not the type of
situation that promotes public confidence in the courts.
3.

Growing Special Interest Group Involvement on Judicial
Politics

The growing involvement of special interest groups in judicial politics further pressures judicial candidates who are strapped for cash. University of Texas Professor Anthony Champagne has observed that "[t]he
result [of elections] can be an unhealthy dependence between the judicial
candidates and interest groups where interest groups back judicial candidates to secure their political agendas and candidates rely on interest
group backing to achieve and retain judicial office. '33 To some analysts
of the judicial system, the increasing involvement of interest groups in
judicial elections challenges the appearance of impartiality. 34 Some have
gone so far as to suggest that judges "are becoming 'captives' of influen'35
tial interest groups.
4.

Judges Elected on PartisanBallots May Buckle to Party
Pressure

Seventeen states select at least some portion of their judges through
partisan elections. 36 In these states, reliance on political parties for support may make judges and candidates especially vulnerable to political
influences. At the outset of the election process, potential candidates
37
must curry favor with party leaders to gain their party's nomination.
After election, the judge may feel indebted to the party for his or her
election and remain reliant on the party for reelection. Those who have
the power of the purse may pull the strings.
Studies have demonstrated that partisan elections may influence judicial decisions. One study which examined partisan voting in eight state
courts concluded: "Where judges are selected in highly partisan circum33 Champagne, supra note 10, at 1393.
34 See id.
35 Id.
36 States with partisan elections include Alabama, Illinois, Indiana, Kansas, Louisiana,
Missouri, New Mexico (after initial gubernatorial appointment), New York, North Carolina,

Pennsylvania, Texas, and West Virginia. While Michigan and Ohio have a nonpartisan ballot,
judicial candidates are nominated through the political parties. See Appendix A.
. 37 Stephen Shapiro, The Judiciary in the United States: A Search
for Fairness, Independence, and Competence, 14 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 667, 672 (2001) (citing Robert Jerome
Glennon, The JurisdictionalLegacy of the Civil Rights Movement, 61 TENN. L. REV. 869, 87984 (1994)).
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stances and depend upon a highly partisan constituency for continuance
in office, they may act in ways which will cultivate support for that constituency, that is, exhibit partisan voting tendencies in their judicial decision making."'38 A judge's partisan backing may be especially influential
39
in deciding political disputes.
While party labels may have some benefits, such as providing a
general indicator to the public on the judge's beliefs,4 0 there is a new and
detrimental level of partisanship in many judicial races. 41 According to
Professor Anthony Champagne, increased competitiveness between the
parties, greater reliance on mass media, and alignment between the parties and ideological groups, may result in more judicial candidates
"adopt[ing] ideologically extreme positions to appeal to the strong par42
tisans and the interest groups allied with that party."
B.

ELECTIONS UNDERMINE

PUBLIC CONFIDENCE IN THE JUDICIARY

United States Supreme Court Justice Anthony Kennedy has remarked that "the law commands allegiance only if it commands respect.
'43
It commands respect only if the public thinks the judges are neutral.
Whether or not the influx of money and partisanship actually impact the
impartiality of the judiciary, judicial elections are undermining the public's respect for judges and the judicial system. As Chief Justice Thomas
Phillips of the Texas Supreme Court has observed, campaign contributions and party labels "compromise the appearance of fairness. '
Justice Phillips has questioned, "When judges are labeled as Democrats or
Republicans, how can you convince the public that the law is a judge's
only constituency? And when a winning litigant has contributed
thousands of dollars to the judge's campaign, how do you ever persuade
45
the losing party that only the facts of the case were considered?"
The public believes that campaign contributions are made to influence a result; campaign contributors are not benevolent donors. A recent
national poll indicates that four out of five Americans believe that
"elected judges are influenced by having to raise campaign funds" and
46
that "[j]udges' decisions are influenced by political considerations.
38 Champagne, supra note 10, at 1413-14 (quoting DUBOIS, supra note 17, at 148).
39 See Williams, supra note 27, at 283-89 (discussing eight political disputes decided
along partisan lines by the Illinois Supreme Court).
40 See generally DuBois, supra note 17; Bateman, supra note 17, at 357.
41 See Champagne, supra note 10, at 1426.
42 Id. at 1426-27.
43 Peter A. Joy, Insulation Neededfor Elected Judges, NAT'L L.J., Jan. 10, 2000, at A19
(quoting Kennedy, J.).
44 The Federalist Soc'y, Judicial Selection White Papers:The Case for JudicialAppointments, at http://www.fed-soc.org/judicialappointments.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2001).
45 Id.
46 Champagne, supra note 10, at 1407-08.
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State polls have produced similar, alarming results. A 1998 study
sponsored by the Texas Supreme Court found that 83% of Texas adults,
69% of court personnel, and 79% of Texas attorneys believed that campaign contributions influenced judicial decisions "very significantly" or
"fairly significantly."' 4 7 Even 48% of Texas judges confessed that they
believed money had an impact on judicial decisions. 48 That same year, a
poll sponsored by a special commission appointed by the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court found that nine out of ten voters believed that judicial
decisions were influenced by large campaign contributions. 49 In recent
polls, 57% of North Dakota residents and 56% of Louisiana voters
agreed.50 An earlier study ordered by the Ohio Supreme Court found
that 58% of voters believed contributions affected judicial decisionmaking. 5 1 These polls suggest that voter attitudes in these states are not
unique, but are shared by voters nationwide.
To make matters worse, the increasing fierceness of judicial campaigns is generating nasty rhetoric and partisanship that no lawyer or
judge can feel good about. "Attack advertising, the use of aggressive
political consultants and what are often only thinly veiled promises to
sustain or overturn controversial decisions are now established parts of
52
campaigns for seats on state courts."
Little, if anything, now separates the tone of judicial campaigns
from other elected offices. For instance, supreme court races in 2000
included "accusations of race baiting, dirty politics, catering to rich trial
lawyers and abdication to business interests. ' 53 One advertisement in
2000 "showed the scales of justice increasingly weighed down by cash as
a narrator suggested that a sitting [Ohio] Supreme Court justice had sold
her vote."' 54 Another ad in Ohio proclaimed that a judge ruled in favor of
an employer in a case of a factory worker dismembered and killed by an
unsafe machine.5 5 In Illinois, a supreme court candidate accused an opponent of sending "innocent men to death row while killers walk the
street. ' 56 In Michigan, a Republican state supreme court justice facing
47 Geyh, supra note 10, at 1470-71.
48 See id.
49 See id.

50 Dale Wetzel, North Dakota Residents Support Courts, But with Reservations, BisMARCK TRIB., Nov. 17, 1999, at 6C; Michelle Millhollon, Poll: Funds Can Sway Louisiana
Judges, ADVOCATE (Baton Rouge, La.), Jan. 10, 2000, at I-A.
51 Suster v. Marshall, 149 F.3d 523, 531 (6th Cir. 1998) (discussing the Ohio Supreme
Court's implementation of expenditure and contribution limits).
52 William Glaberson, Fierce Campaigns Signal a New Era for State Courts, N.Y.
TIMES, June 5, 2000, at Al.
53 id.
54 Glaberson, supra note 6, at Al.
55 See Spencer Hunt, Chief Justice: Appoint Judges, ENQUIRER COLUMBUS BUREAU,
Nov. 10, 2000.
56 Glaberson, supra note 52, at Al.
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reelection was the subject of a flier distributed by the National Association for the Advancement of Colored People ("NAACP") proclaiming
that the justice was a "staunch believer that Brown v. Board of Education
was wrong."'57 The targeted justice, Robert P. Young, Jr., who is Afriv.
can-American, argued that he had long publicly supported the Brown 58
baiting.
race
of
NAACP
the
accused
and
Board of Education decision
In Idaho, a supporter of an opponent to an incumbent justice placed a
newspaper advertisement stating, in large type, "Will partial-birth abortion and same-sex marriage become legal in Idaho? Perhaps so, if liberal
Supreme Court Judge Cathy Silak remains on the Idaho Supreme
Court."'5 9 Justice Silak describes herself as a moderate who has never

expressed views on either subject.60 In the 1996 campaign, Alabama
Supreme Court Justice Kenneth Ingram aired commercials portraying his
opponent, Harold See, as a fast-walking skunk with the message, "You
61
can smell what Harold See is up to."

The influence of special interest groups in judicial races also adds to
the potential for invidious attacks against candidates for the bench. Special interest groups, unlike judicial candidates, have the luxury of attacking candidates without the limitations imposed by judicial codes of
conduct. 62 In what was characterized as "the most bitter election in
[North Carolina] Supreme Court history," a special interest group attacked Justice James Exum's record on the death penalty by featuring
"families of murder victims in news conferences in which they criticized
the justice's decisions. '63 Justice Exum's opponent responded by renouncing the group's tactics, but noted that the state's judicial code bars
Justice Exum from defending himself. 64
One must question whether the public will continue to hold judges
in high esteem when they see judicial candidates engaged in or subject to
such smear campaigns and character assassinations. Michigan Governor
John Engler, a proponent of replacing elections for state supreme court
57 Id.
58 See id.
59 Id.

60 See id.
61 Bill Poovey, State Supreme Court Justice Compares GOP Opponent to a Skunk, AsSOC. PRESS, Oct. 9, 1996.
62 See discussion infra Part II.A.3.
63 Grimes, supra note 22, at 2288-89 (describing the race for Chief Justice between two
sitting members of the North Carolina Supreme Court) (internal citations omitted).
64 Id. The commentary to the Model Code of Judicial Conduct explains that a candidate
may respond to an attack, but only so long as the candidate's response does not appear to
commit the candidate to a decision in a case that might come before him or involve a pledge
other than to faithfully and impartially perform his duties. See AM. BAR ASS'N, MODEL CODE
OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT Canon 5A(3)(d) (commentary) & Canon 5A(3)(e) (1990). A response
by Justice Exum that he is "tough on criminals" or "in favor of the death penalty in certain
circumstances" could run afoul of the judicial code.
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justices with appointments, summed up the prevailing opinion on the
subject of judicial elections when he recently stated that "[t]he campaigns have a less than helpful effect in terms of the image of the
judiciary.

C.

65

ELECTIONS MAY DISCOURAGE SERVICE

BY

QUALIFIED JURISTS

Most people agree that the principal qualifications for a judge are "a
competent mastery of the law, good moral character, intelligence, impartiality, emotional stability, courtesy, decisiveness, and administrative
ability," plus a high level of education and experience. 66 While the ability to raise money, contacts in the political establishment, and charisma
may be somewhat appropriate traits for selection of candidates for legislative or executive office, they have no relevance to the qualifications of
a judge. As Former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Nathan Heffernan
observed:
[I]n the 1996 election for the [Wisconsin] Supreme
Court, newspapers complained that one of the candidates
for the Supreme Court was "flamboyant" and the other
"boring." The adjectives are for the media to choose.
They could just as well have typified the candidates as
"flaky" and "thoughtful" or "inspirational" and "dull."
These adjectives are not helpful touchstones for the selection of a judge whose job it is to find and construe the
law, not on the basis of idiosyncratic surface characteristics, but on the basis of scholarship, integrity, and juris67
prudential principles of the common law.
A recent Arizona Republic editorial advocating for the extension of
that state's merit selection system to elected judges in rural counties critiqued elective systems as those in which "the woman or man who can
raise the most money, make the best-sounding campaign slogans and
back-slap most effectively gets the black robe."'6 8 While this may be an
overly cynical viewpoint, these types of skills do not appear most pertinent to the bench.
65 Glaberson, supra note 6, at Al.
66 Judith L. Maute, Selection Justice in State Courts: The Ballot Box or the Backroom?,
41 S. TEX. L. REV. 1197, 1225 (2000) (citing Jona Goldschmidt, Selection and Retention of
Judges: Is Florida's Present System Still the Best Compromise?: Merit Selection: Current
Status, Procedures, and Issues, 49 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1, 29-31 (1994) (stating the criteria that
most nominating commissioners list in their rules for evaluating judicial applicants)).
67 Nathan S. Heffernan, JudicialResponsibility, Judicial Independence and the Election
of Judges, 80 MARQ. L. REV. 1031, 1043 (1997).
68 Editorial, Picking JPs on Merit is Only Sane Approach, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Nov. 26,
2001.
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The mere requirement of participating in a contested judicial election and the necessity of raising large amounts of cash may cause qualified candidates to opt out of public service. 69 This problem will worsen
as the cost of judicial campaigns continues to rise and candidates are
forced to spend more of their own money on elections. Positions on the
bench may become limited to those who can purchase them or are willing to take out personal loans to finance their campaigns. 70 Successful
practitioners may not be able to afford the time away from their jobs or
the resulting decrease in income. 7' Government attorneys, who might
make excellent judges, may not be able to campaign for office because
they must be physically present at their jobs and may lack the personal
finances to launch a campaign. 72 Those who run face uncertainty in at73 If
taining the position and financial risk in financing the campaign.
they are fortunate enough to win, they may be forced to trade a more
74
lucrative salary for campaign debt.

The reelection process also fails to promote a qualified judiciary.
Experienced judges may be defeated not because of a lack of judicial
competence, but due to poor campaigning skills or a simple shift in the
political wind. 75 Former Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Heffernan
noted that in one election, three Wisconsin Supreme Court justices were
defeated at the polls because "[t]hey were rather shy and retiring and
lacked the presumptuous ego that a candidate for public office seems to
need. In short, they were not politicians. They... were 'charismatically
impaired."' 76 Likewise, an incumbent judge with twelve years of experience on the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals was defeated by a challenger that had been found to have misrepresented his record before the
election, had virtually no criminal law experience, and had been fined for

69 See Shapiro, supra note 37, at 672; Ty Meighan, Judicial Reform Problems Aired:
Politics, Fund Raising Keep Qualified Candidates Off Ballot, CORPUS CHRISTI CALLER-TIMES,

Sept. 3, 1999, at B8.
70 See Hon. Shirley S. Abrahamson, Speech: The Ballot and the Bench, 76 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 973, 995 (2001). A recent study found that 6.4% of the funding for state supreme court
races came from the candidate's personal finances or loans. See ABA REPORT, supra note 24,
at 15 (citing Samantha Sanchez, Money in Judicial Politics, Mar. 21, 2001, at 7). The need to
pay off personal loans further strains a judge's ability to remain independent as he or she is
forced to solicit contributions even after winning election. Id. at 15-16.
71 The Federalist Soc'y, JudicialSelection White Papers: The Casefor JudicialAppoint-.
ments, at http://www.fed-soc.org/judicialappointments.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2001).
72 See id.
73 See Maute, supra note 66, at 1205.
74 See Shapiro, supra note 37, at 671.
75 See Editorial, Courting Disaster; Partisan Elections Almost Guarantee Some Poor
Judges, HOUSTON CHRON., July 27, 2001, at A34 (urging adoption of merit selection system).
76 Heffeman, supra note 67, at 1036-37.
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practicing law without a license in another state. 77 According to Texas
Supreme Court Chief Justice Tom Phillips, since 1980, "207 district and
appellate judges have been tossed out of office, often simply because of
their party label." 7 8 Furthermore, aspiring judges may hire skilled political consultants to assist them in defeating qualified incumbents. 79 These
political consultants are not driven by the legal competence of a candidate, but simply by the desire to win the election for a client that can
afford to pay for their services. 80
D.

ELECTIONS ARE INCOMPATIBLE WITH JUDICIAL SELECTION

The heart of the problem with judicial elections is that the popular
election of judges is fundamentally at odds with the concept of an impartial judiciary. The United States has two political branches: the legislative and executive. Members of the judicial branch, however, are not
direct representatives of the people, but are expected to act as impartial
arbiters of cases and controversies. This impartiality is lost when judicial
candidates indicate how they might decide political, legal, or social issues that are likely to come before them. On the other hand, without
such information, voters have little basis to make an informed choice
between candidates; judicial election becomes an exercise in futility.
Money raising and mud-throwing in judicial races further damages the
public's confidence in the courts. Although public participation in the
judicial system may be useful for educating people on the role of the
courts and building a level of accountability into the system, the best way
to accomplish these goals is not by means of elections, but through the
public's role as a juror, litigant, and witness.
1. Judges are Not Representatives of the Majority
The cornerstone of democratic governance is the election of public
officers from among the citizenry. Popular election dictates that officers
of the government represent the people and the reelection process assures
that they are held accountable for their responsiveness. As de Toc77

See Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Selection of Judges in Kansas:A Comparison of Systems,

69 J. KAN. B.A. 32, 39-40 (2000) (citing Stephen B. Bright, Political Attacks on the Judiciary,
80 JUDICATURE 165, 171 (1997)).
78 Hon. Tom Phillips, State's Top Judge Says Change Need to be Made, ABILENE REPORTER-NEws, Feb. 25, 2001 (excerpt from Chief Justice Phillips' address to the legislature on

February 13, 2001).
79 See Mary Hladky, About-Face: Campaign Consultant on Stump Against Election of
Judges, PALM BEACH DAILY Bus. REV., Sept. 11, 1998, at A3.
80 Gerald Schwartz, a judicial campaign consultant of 40-years who recently made a 180degree turn in support of appointive systems, has candidly stated that political consultants

"take on both unqualified and underqualified candidates against judges who have superb
records." Mary Hladky, About-Face: Campaign Consultant on Stump Against Election of
Judges, PALM BEACH DAILY Bus. REV., Sept. 11,1998, at A3 (quoting Mr. Schwartz).
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queville observed, "The Americans determined that the members of the
legislature should be elected by the people immediately, and for a very
brief term, in order to subject them, not only to the general convictions,
but even to the daily passions, of their constituents."'8' The same can be
said of our elected governors, mayors, and other executive officers.
Most will agree that judges should not be subject to the daily passions of their "constituents," to political parties, or to campaign contributors. Judges have a different role in the American political system than
legislative or executive officers. 82 Unlike their non-judicial colleagues,
judges decide specific cases or controversies. It is not within the judicial
authority to formulate broad public policy. Judges are supposed to reach
their decisions based not on the wishes of those who selected them, but
impartially on the basis of statutes, case precedent, and constitutional
83
protections.
The late California Supreme Court Justice Otto Kaus observed that
"ignoring the political consequences of visible decisions is 'like ignoring
a crocodile in your bathtub."' 84 Judges who are subject to popular election are under pressure to be responsive to the same popular and political
forces as legislators and executive officers. 8 5 As Professor Steven Croley of the University of Michigan Law School has recognized, "Where
the judiciary as well as the legislature and executive is elected, no branch
remains to safeguard constitutionalism against majoritarian excesses. '8 6
For example, the southern states still face the challenge of overcoming
the long history of elected judges tolerating or participating in racial
discrimination.

87

The safeguarding of minority rights does not provide the only demonstration of the need for an independent judiciary. Judges may be con81 DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 1,at 246.
82 See Rottman & Schotland, supra note 2, at 1370.
83 See AM. BAR ASS'N, MODEL CODE OF JUDICIAL CONDUCT preamble (2000) [hereinafter ABA MODEL CODE].
84 Richard L. Hasen, "High Court Wrongly Elected": A Public Choice Model of Judging
and Its Implicationsfor the Voting Rights Act, 75 N.C. L. REV. 1305, 1320 (1997) (citing
Julian N. Eule, JudicialReview of Direct Democracy, 99 YALE L.J. 1503, 1583 (1990) (quoting Paul Reidinger, The Politics of Judging, A.B.A. J., Apr. 1987, at 52, 58)).
85 See Marty Trillhaase, Editorial, JudicialRace Standards Needed, IDAHO FALLS POST
REGISTER, Oct. 31, 2000, at A6 (discussing the perception that Idaho Chief Justice Linda Copple Trout reversed herself and formed a new 3-2 majority in a controversial case due to her
impending 2002 election).
86 Steven P. Croley, The MajoritarianDifficulty: Elective Judiciariesand the Rule of
Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 780 (1995).
87 See generally Stephen B. Bright, Can JudicialIndependence be Attained in the South?
Overcoming History, Elections, and Misperceptions About the Role of the Judiciary, 14 GA.
ST. U. L. REV. 817 (1998) (detailing the shocking history of civil rights abuses of southern
courts and advocating adoption of the merit system to replace elective systems of judicial
selection). African-Americans came to rely on the federal courts, whose judges are insulated
from majority pressure by lifetime appointment, to protect their rights. See id.
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fronted with cases in which the law supports a decision that will be
unpopular with the voters - decisions that could cost judges their jobs if
they are subject to reelection. 88 The pressure on elected judges may be
particularly strong in visible cases when an election looms near.
There are many classes of unpopular defendants with a common
right to a fair trial. For example, elected judges may be tempted to compromise the procedural rights of criminal defendants lest they appear soft
on crime. 89 Most disturbing are several studies by Melinda Gann Hall,
Professor of Judicial Politics and Behavior at Michigan State University,
which found that state supreme court justices facing reelection in states
where the death penalty is particularly popular are reluctant to cast dissenting votes in death penalty cases - even if they believe the sentence
should be overturned. 90 In fact, judges in these states may scramble to
be assigned to death penalty cases to obtain favorable press coverage,
and may even be more likely in an election year to ignore a jury recommendation for a life sentence and impose the death penalty where state
law permits.9 '
Likewise, unpopular civil defendants, such as large, out-of-state
corporations, might not receive as fair a trial in front of an elected judge
as an appointed judge. For example, an elected judge may rationally
favor in-state plaintiffs, who vote and have friends and relatives who
92
vote, over out-of-state corporations.
See Croley, supra note 86, at 727.
89 See id.
90 See Scott D. Wiener, Note, PopularJustice: State Elections and ProceduralDue Process, 31 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 187, 200 (1996) (citing Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic Voting in State Supreme Courts, 54 J. POL. 427 (1992); Paul Brace &
Melinda Gann Hall, Neo-lnstitutionalismand Dissent in State Supreme Courts, 52 J. POL. 54
(1990); Melinda Gann Hall, Constituent Influence in State Supreme Courts: Conceptual Notes
and a Case Study, 49 J. POL. 1117 (1987)).
91 See Wiener, supra note 90, at 200 (citing Stephen B. Bright & Patrick J. Keenan,
Judges and the Politicsof Death: Deciding Between the Bill of Rights and the Next Election in
Capital Cases, 75 B.U. L. REV. 759, 793-94 (1995)). For example, Justice Stevens has observed that in states in which judges may override a jury's sentence of life imprisonment and
impose the death penalty that "[e]lected judges often appear to listen [to] the many voters who
generally favor capital punishment but who have far less information about a particular trial
than the jurors who have sifted patiently through details of the relevant and admissible evidence. How else do we account for the disturbing propensity of elected judges to impose the
death sentence time after time notwithstanding a jury's recommendation of life?" Bright and
Kennan, supra, at 794 (quoting Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639, 713 n.4 (1990) (Stevens, J.,
dissenting)).
92 See The Federalist Soc'y, JudicialSelection White Papers: The Casefor Judicial Appointments, at http://www.fed-soc.org/judicialappointments.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2001).
One reason for the bias against out-of-state businesses was stated by elected-Justice Richard
Neely of the West Virginia Supreme Court of Appeals. He explained, "As long as I am allowed to redistribute wealth from out-of-state companies to injured in-state plaintiffs, I shall
continue to do so. Not only is my sleep enhanced when I give someone else's money away,
but so is my job security, because the in-state plaintiffs, their families, and their friends will
88
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The Public Lacks the Information and Motivation to Make an
Informed Decision

Voter turnout repeatedly demonstrates the public's lack of interest
in judicial elections. For example, only three out of ten registered voters
93
statewide came to the polls in Pennsylvania's 1997 judicial elections.
In Wisconsin, a state with one of the highest presidential election turnouts in the nation, less than one in four registered voters participate in
judicial elections on average. 94 In many elections, the voters often cannot even name the sitting incumbent. 95 For example, one survey of New
York voters revealed 75% could not recall the name of the judicial candidate they had voted for minutes earlier. 96 The case of a Superior Court
Judge in California recently made national headlines. 97 Just two days
after Superior Court Judge Robert C. Kline filed unopposed candidacy
papers for reelection, a federal grand jury returned an indictment charg98
ing him with child molestation and possession of child pornography.
Maintaining his innocence, Judge Kline was placed under house arrest
and required to wear an electronic bracelet after posting a $50,000
bond. 99 Experts warned that Judge Kline would be difficult to unseat in
the March primary because his name alone would appear on the ballot
reelect me." Id. at 18 (quoting Justice Neely in The Product Liability Mess); see also Games
v. Fleming Landfill, Inc., 413 S.E.2d 897, 905 (W.Va. 1991) ("State courts have adopted
standards that are, for the most part, not predictable, not consistent and not uniform. Such
fuzzy standards inevitably are most likely to be applied arbitrarily against out-of-state defendants."); Blankenship v. Gen. Motors Corp., 406 S.E.2d 781, 786 (W. Va. 1991) ("[W]e do not
claim that our adoption of rules liberal to plaintiffs comports, necessarily, with some Platonic
ideal of perfect justice. Rather, for a tiny state incapable of controlling the direction of the

national law in terms of appropriate trade-offs among employment, research, development, and
compensation for the injured users of products, the adoption of rules liberal to plaintiffs is
simple self-defense."). There is evidence to support bias of elected judges against out-of-state
corporations, a category of defendants already unpopular with juries. A recent study found
that tort awards against out-of-state defendants were $364,950 above average, while awards in
states with appointed judiciaries were $219,980 above average. See The Federalist Soc'y,
Judicial Selection White Papers: The Case for Judicial Appointments, at http://www.fedsoc.org/judicialappointments.htm (last visited Dec. 3, 2001).
93 See Lynn A. Marks & Ellen Mattleman Kaplan, Guest Commentary: Appellate Judges
Should Be Appointed, Not Elected, PA. L. WEEKLY, Dec. 8, 1997, at 4. The authors write that
due to the public's lack of information on judicial candidates, some candidates that, according
to the Pennsylvania Judicial Evaluation Commission, were less qualified defeated more highly
rated opponents. Id. Likewise, an evaluation by the Chicago Council of Lawyers found no
qualified candidates in 11 out of 38 contests in the 1997 Cook County primary. Tim Novak &
Mark Brown, Many Candidatesfor Judge Unqualified, Lawyers Say, CHICAGO SUN-TIMEs,
Mar. 6, 1997, at 4.
94 See Abrahamson, supra note 70, at 992.
95 See Shapiro, supra note 37, at 672.
96 See Heffeman, supra note 67, at 1045.
97 See Barbara Whitaker, Judge Facing Pornography Charges is Unopposed on Ballot,
N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 2, 2002, at A10.
98 Id.
99 Id.
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and due to the public's general lack of awareness and interest in judicial
races. 1°° Due to high media publicity of the allegations, Judge Kline did
not win the primary election, but still received enough votes to place
second and force a run-off election in November.' 0 ' This is just one real
example of how the lack of interest in running for the bench combined
with the public's lack of information or awareness of judicial races can
have dire consequences. Those who reach the polls may be motivated by
other races on the ballot and then choose between judicial candidates on
10 2
a whim, or simply based on ballot placement or party affiliation.
The public's lack of interest may not be as much due to general
voter apathy as an understandable result of the nature of the judicial system. The reason for the public's lack of interest is two-fold. First, limits
on judicial speech in many states guarantee that the public does not have
relevant information to make an informed decision. Second, the public
may feel that it does not have much at stake in judicial elections, especially in the selection of trial court judges.
a.

Limits on Speech in Judicial Campaigns Keep Information
from the Public

Campaigns in legislative and executive races are characterized by
dialogue on topics of public interest such as school funding, reproductive
rights, civil rights and liberties, tort reform, gun control, crime, and numerous others. Ethics rules, however, largely prevent judicial candidates
from indicating their position on these issues. 0 3 That is because the
American Bar Association's Model Code of Judicial Conduct (hereinafter "Judicial Code"), 1° prohibits judicial candidates from indicating how
they might rule on issues that might come before them. 10 5 Candidates
100

Id.
101 See California'sElection; Indicted Judge In A Runoff, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 7, 2002, at

A21. Judge Kline's attempt to remove his name from the runoff ballot was opposed by county

officials because it would create a precedent permitting candidates to withdraw at any point
rather than win or lose at the ballot box. See Jean 0. Pasco, Board to Fight Kline's Pullout,
L.A. TIMES, Mar. 26, 2002.
102 See Heffernan, supra note 67, at 1044-45.
103 See, e.g., Berger v. Sup. Ct. of Ohio, 598 F. Supp. 69, 76 (S.D. Ohio 1984), aff'd, 861

F.2d 719 (6th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 490 U.S. 1108 (1989) (in upholding a judicial canon
restricting a judicial candidate's campaign activities, the trial court noted that "[t]he very purpose of the judicial function makes inappropriate the same kind of particularized pledges and
predetermined commitments that mark campaigns for legislative and executive office. A
judge acts on individual cases, not broad programs.").
104 See ABA MODEL CODE supra note 83.
105 See Hon. Mary Libby Payne, Mississippi Judicial Elections: A Problem Without a
Solution?, 67 Miss. L.J. 1, 10-11 (1997). Judge Libby Payne of the Mississippi Court of
Appeals, a proponent of speech restrictions on judicial candidates, acknowledges that according to the judicial code, judicial candidates can do little more in their campaigns than "promise
to perform faithfully and impartially the duties of one's office." Id. at 10.
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who break these rules can face sanctions ranging from removal from office, suspension, or loss of their license to practice law.
Canon 5 of the Judicial Code provides that "a judge or judicial candidate shall refrain from inappropriate political activity."' 0 6 Examples
include "pledges or promises of conduct in office other than the faithful
and impartial performance of the duties of the office."' 10 7 Judges are prohibited from "mak[ing] statements that commit or appear to commit the
candidate with respect to cases, controversies or issues that are likely to
come before the court."' 08 The purpose of these "gag rules" is to ensure
that judges feel free to reach decisions based on the unique facts of each
case instead of feeling compelled to rule in a manner that satisfies a campaign promise. Columnist George F. Will, in discussing Minnesota's Judicial Code, a portion of which currently faces review in the United
States Supreme Court,' 0 9 made the following astute observation:
The "announce" clause prohibits judicial candidates
from announcing "their views on disputed legal or political issues." The "endorsement" clause forbids candidates "to seek, accept or use" an endorsement from any
political party organization. The "attend or speak"
clauses prohibit candidates from "attending political
gatherings" or speaking at political party gatherings ....
What, you may wonder, is the point of conducting elections if candidates are forbidden to say anything that
might enable voters to make informed choices? I 10
Not only does the Judicial Code prohibit a candidate from making
statements on his or her own views, it also discourages candidates from
commenting on the views or qualifications of an opponent. The Judicial
Code provides that a judicial candidate may not "knowingly misrepresent
the identity, qualifications, present position or other fact concerning the
candidate or an opponent."' Candidates that run "false or misleading"
campaign advertisements may face sanctions under some state judicial
codes. ' 2 While limits on false or misleading statements or advertisements appear to rest on sound public policy, the truth, if it exists, is often
difficult to ascertain. Ethical candidates may not risk challenging an opponent's qualifications, or responding to an attack, if there is a risk of
106 ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 83, Canon 5.
107 ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 83, Canon 5A(3)(d)(i).
108 ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 83, Canon 5A(3)(d)(ii).

109 See Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. granted,
122 S. Ct. 643 (2001).
1lo George F. Will, Minnesota Speech Police, WASH. POST., Jan. 3, 2002, at A17.
I

'

ABA MODEL CODE, supra note 83, Canon 5A(3)(d)(iii).

112 See, e.g., ALA. CANONS OF JUDICIAL ETHICS Canon 7B(2) (2001); OHIO CODE OF JUDI-

CIAL CONDUCT Canon 7(E)(1) (2001).
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sanctions. Less ethical candidates, as has been shown, often ignore the
rules and rarely face substantial sanctions for their conduct."13
The jury is out on whether the judiciary would be better off with
more speech or less speech. Even those who fall on the side of speech
favor some restriction. As Judge Richard Posner of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit recognized in striking down
Illinois' version of Canon 7B(1)(c) as overbroad, "Judges remain different from legislators and executive officials, even when all are elected, in
ways that bear on the strength of the state's interest in restricting their
freedom of speech." 1 14 Strong proponents of the rigid restrictions of the
Judicial Code realize that attack ads and partisan bickering have real effects on the public perception of the judiciary. They are aware that farreaching statements by judicial candidates, such as "I'm tough on crime"
and "I support workers' rights," or more targeted statements such as "I
am pro-life," damage the concept of an impartial judiciary and may cause
certain defendants (civil or criminal) to conclude, quite rationally, that
they will not receive justice from that particular judge.
On the other hand, many commentators who oppose campaign
speech restrictions argue that the public needs information about a person's viewpoint in order to cast an informed vote. These commentators
sometimes oppose the election of judges, but argue that if a state chooses
to elect its judges and force them to become politicians, the state must
allow candidates to make their case and provide the voters with the tools
to make an informed choice. 1 5 These commentators also reason that
judicial candidates, like everyone else in America, have a First Amend6 For this reason, many states have
ment right to express their opinions. 11
found the breadth of their restrictions on judicial campaign speech challenged in court as unconstitutional, 1 7 and some states have dropped the
"gag rule" all together.'' 8 In fact, this year, the United States Supreme
Court will decide whether to reverse a decision of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit upholding ethics rules in Minne113 See section II.B.
114 Buckley v. I11.
Judicial Inquiry Bd., 997 F.2d 224, 228 (7th Cir. 1993).
115 See Will, supra note 110, at A17.
116 Government-imposed restrictions on speech must be justified by a compelling interest.
In cases challenging judicial speech restrictions, the courts must determine whether the restriction is narrowly tailored to address the state's interest in protecting the independence, impartiality and integrity of the judiciary. See, e.g., J.C.J.D. v. R.J.C.R., 803 S.W.2d 953, 955-56
(Ky. 1991).
117 See Richard A. Dove, Judicial Campaign Conduct: Rules, Education, and Enforcement, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 1447, 1453-58 (2001) (discussing recent cases involving judicial
candidate speech); see also Abrahamson, supra note 70, at 1001-03.
118 See Grimes, supra note 22, at 2290-93 (discussing the North Carolina Supreme
Court's decision to amend its judicial code to eliminate the prohibition on candidates against
stating their opinions on "disputed legal or political issues" following imposition of a temporary restraining order by a federal court).
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sota which prohibit judicial candidates from "announc[ing] their views
19
on disputed legal or political issues."' '
The ultimate outcome of constitutional challenges and the philosophical debate surrounding restrictions on judicial speech is uncertain.
What is clear from this debate is that the fundamental conflict between
the judicial role and popular elections will continue as long as states must
choose between hollow elections or undermining judicial integrity.
b.

The Public is Not Interested in Judicial Elections

Judges, especially trial judges, do not generally have as broad an
impact on people's lives as executives or legislators. Unlike the broad
public policies espoused by governors and legislators, judges make decisions affecting individual litigants in cases that come before them. For
instance, the public has an incentive to familiarize itself with legislative
candidates that will decide how much they will pay in taxes, whether
potholes will get filled, and how much they will need to pay for their
children's public college tuition.' 20 The likelihood that a judge, especially at the trial court level, will directly affect a particular citizen is
remote. 12 ' Without this self-interest, voters lose an incentive to invest
the time needed to familiarize themselves with judicial candidates. 122
c.

Elections Without Substance

Since there is little substantive information available to make an
informed decision between judicial candidates, the public is often forced
to rely on surface characteristics. As a recent editorial in Newsday observed, "elections where candidates are muzzled are a sham. Voters are
left to make choices based on minutiae, such as the apparent ethnicity of
a name, a candidate's gender or party affiliation." 23 For example, voters
elected Robert Pineiro as a Circuit Judge in Florida's heavily Hispanic
Dade County in 1997. After his election, Judge Pineiro found that he
was "congratulated on having the foresight and judicial acumen of having the right name."' 124 Name recognition, of course, is best promoted
119 Republican Party of Minn. v. Kelly, 247 F.3d 854, 857 (8th Cir. 2001), cert.
granted,122 S. Ct. 643 (2001). See generally Charles Lane, High Court to Review Curbs on
Judicial Candidates, WASH. POST, Dec. 4, 2001, at A5.
120 See Croley, supra note 86, at 731-32.
121 See id. at 732.
122 See id. at 731-32.
123 See Abdon M. Pallasch, Woman's Place is on Bench, CHICAGO SUN-TIMES, Mar. 25,

2002, at 2 (discussing voter's selection of female, Irish-sounding, and familiar names without
regard to qualifications); see also Editorial, Limits on Campaigning Show Flaw in Electing
Judges, NEWSDAY, Dec. 10, 2001, at A26.
124 Martin Wisckol, Judge Wants His Job Appointed Not Elected ConstitutionalCommission Urged to Change Rule, FORT LAUDERDALE SUN-SENTINEL, Aug. 21, 1997. Judge Pineiro
admits that the reason for his election had little to do with his qualifications and he is now
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through advertising. This promotes "competence-neutral" judicial elections where the candidate who can raise and spend the most money
125
stands the best chance of winning.
The lack of information about judicial candidates also causes campaigns to focus on petty issues in comparison to those that reflect the
importance of the judiciary. For example, Chief Justice Shirley Abrahamson of the Wisconsin Supreme Court laments that her 1999 election
"involved such lofty issues as the appropriateness of my sponsoring a
staff aerobic class in the courtroom after hours, my decision to hang a
portrait of the first woman to be admitted to the Wisconsin Supreme
Court bar, and the removal of computer games from justices'
26
computers."
3.

The Public Already Participatesin the Judicial System: As
Juror, Litigant, and Witness

Advocates of judicial elections usually emphasize the importance of
public participation in the judicial system. Judicial elections, say these
advocates, provide the public with an education on the judicial role and
process. Although elections provide one means of public participation,
the judicial system already provides more appropriate means for involving people in the courts: through the public's role as juror, litigant, and
witness.
The Sixth and Seventh Amendments to the United States Constitution safeguard the right to trial by jury of one's peers in criminal and
civil cases. 127 Citizens have the right, responsibility, and duty of serving
as members of a jury. As jurors, people have the opportunity to directly
participate in the judicial process. Jurors are granted the ability to decide
the outcome of a case that may take away someone's life, liberty, or
property. The right to trial by jury places limits on the power and discretion of judges. It provides criminal defendants and civil litigants with the
means to remove a case from the judge's complete discretion and place
at least some decisions in the hands of his or her fellow citizens. Jurors
may even balance the power of the legislature by refusing to apply the
law in cases where they feel an unjust outcome would result - a concept
known as "jury nullification."' 12 8 Through periodically serving as a juror,
citizens receive the ultimate education in how the judicial process
supporting a movement in Florida toward adoption of an appointive system of judicial selection. See id.
125 Steven Day, Objection, Your Honor! I Didn't Vote for You!, TomPaine.common

sense, at http://www.tompaine.com/opinion/2001/02/01/2.html (last visited Dec. 10, 2001).
126 Abrahamson, supra note 70, at 975.
127 See U.S. CONST. amends. VI, VII.
128 See, e.g., Paul Butler, Racially Based Jury Nullification: Black Power in the Criminal
Justice System, 105 YALE L.J. 677 (1995).
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works.' 29 They also have the power to shape the outcome of a case.
These lessons are not learned through punching a hole on a ballot based
on several months of listening to attack ads of little substance.
A less frequent means through which the public participates in the
judicial process is either as a litigant, criminal defendant, or a witness.
As litigants or criminal defendants, people have a concrete stake in the
fairness of the courts. Witnesses also gain first-hand knowledge of the
judicial process through their own involvement in a case.
III.

PROPOSED SOLUTIONS TO JUDICIAL ELECTIONS FAIL
TO SOLVE CORE PROBLEMS

Several commentators recognize that the increasing money, vile
rhetoric, and increasing partisanship in judicial campaigns is a serious
problem that affects the public's confidence in the judiciary, but they
stop short of calling for a move to an appointive system. Instead, they
advocate for minute changes to the electoral system, such as public financing of elections, contribution limits, restrictions on the speech of
judicial candidates, or moving from partisan to nonpartisan elections.
Although these reforms may ameliorate some of the damage that elections are causing to the judicial system, they cannot alter the structural
and philosophical contradiction between the concepts of political accountability and judicial independence.
A.

PUBLIC FINANCING IS INEFFECTIVE

Recognizing that the United States Supreme Court has ruled that
spending limits may violate the First Amendment, 130 the American Bar
Association (which has long been a strong proponent of merit selection)
and others such as Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Shirley Abrahamson and Indiana University Law Professor Charles Gardner Geyh suggest
that campaign finance reform is the answer to the ever-increasing flow of
money into judicial campaigns. 13 ' Public financing programs, however,
often depend upon the willingness of taxpayers to check a box on their
129 The authors note that jury reform efforts, which are proceeding in many states, are
crucial to providing jurors with a rewarding and productive jury experience, as well as the
means to reach well-reasoned decisions. See, e.g., AM. JUDICATURE Soc'Y, ENHANCING THE
JURY SYSTEM: A GUIDEBOOK FOR JURY REFORM (1999) (providing an overview of the recent

jury reform movement and detailed descriptions of comprehensive jury reform efforts in Arizona, California, Colorado, the District of Columbia and New York).
130 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 51 (1976).
131 See Abrahamson, supra note 70, at 999; see also Geyh, supra note 10, at 1467; see
also Scott William Faulkner, Still on the Backburner: Reforming the Judicial Selection Process in Alabama, 52 ALA. L. REV. 1269, 1288-99 (2001) (advocating for public financing of
judicial campaigns in Alabama). Although public financing legislation has been introduced in
over twenty states, only Wisconsin has enacted a partial public financing system for supreme
court races and its program is nearing financial failure. See Geyh, supra note 10, at 1476-81.
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tax form to contribute to the public financing fund and upon providing
judicial candidates an incentive to accept a small amount of public
32
money in exchange for agreeing to campaign spending limitations.'
Partial public funding however, can be a drop in the bucket when 1an
33
effective campaign requires millions of dollars to be raised and spent.
Moreover, public funding for judicial candidates has no impact whatso34
ever on independent campaign expenditures by special interest groups.'
Interest groups will gain further power as judicial candidates, who already face restrictions on speech, are also limited in their spending and
will not be adequately able to respond to campaign attacks.
B.

CONTRIBUTION LIMITS PLACE ADDITIONAL STRAINS ON JUDICIAL
CANDIDATES

Contribution limits provide another method for reducing the influence of money in judicial campaigns. 135 Thirty-nine states impose contribution limits in judicial campaigns, 136 a method of campaign finance
reform permitted by the United States Supreme Court. 137 Such restrictions seek to remove the suggestion that a judge can be paid off through a
large campaign contribution from a special interest group or a party that
138
is likely to come before the court.
One of the problems with contribution limits, however, is that they
may place additional pressure on judicial candidates to solicit contributions from the lawyers who appear before them and require that sitting
judges who are up for reelection spend more time soliciting contributions
and less time on the bench. The burden imposed by contribution limits
may also make it easier for those who can afford to simply purchase the
robe with their own personal finances to do so while those who are not
independently wealthy must go door to door to mount an effective
campaign.
C.

RESTRICTIONS ON JUDICIAL SPEECH LEAD TO ELECTIONS
DOMINATED BY SPECIAL INTERESTS

Others who seek to retain an elected system of judicial selection
address the degradation of the judiciary through repulsive campaign advertisements and attacks by arguing for strict enforcement of the speech
limitations imposed by judicial codes of conduct. As discussed earlier,
132
133
134
135

See Geyh, supra note 10, at 1478-79.
See id. at 1479.
See id. at 1479-80.
See, e.g., Faulkner, supra note 131, at 1281-88.

136 Id. at 1281.

137 See Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 35 (1976).
138 See Faulkner, supra note 131, at 1281.
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not only does this approach face constitutional First Amendment challenge, it also discourages candidates from providing voters with information in what is already by design an informational void. In any event,
judicial codes of conduct have no force over special interest groups that
can say whatever they want. The unfortunate result is that judicial candidates are reluctant to defend their record when they are attacked by a
special interest group out of fear of being sanctioned.139 Judges should
not be politicians, but if the public is to choose its judges through elections, then judicial candidates must be given the ability to express their
views. 140

D.

MOVING FROM PARTISAN TO NONPARTISAN ELECTIONS SOLVES
NOTHING

In those states with partisan elections, reformers have suggested
moving to nonpartisan elections as a way of reducing the influence of
politics over the courts. But political parties, whether reflected on the
ballot or not, will still continue to impact judicial campaigns. Candidates
will simply seek to align themselves with interest groups with the strong
backing of a political party. Voters will also lose a valuable piece of
information that may help them to determine a candidate's philosophy
and make an informed decision, while not indicating how the candidate
would vote in a particular case. Furthermore, the use of partisan versus
nonpartisan elections does not appear to affect the troubling amount of
14
money spent on political campaigns.
IV.

APPOINTIVE JUDICIAL SELECTION SYSTEMS OFFER
A SOLUTION

Judicial selection through appointment may provide a solution to
the various problems associated with judicial elections. This section de139 Mississippi Court of Appeals Judge Libby Payne's solution to this problem is that the
public should be wary of candidates that take positions on controversial issues as promoted by
special interests and that the public should be educated to select candidates that are only "prolaw." See Payne, supra note 105, at 40-41 (approving of statement made in a newspaper
editorial urging for adoption of an appointive system, Supreme Court, Vote for Independence
and Dignity, CLARION-LEDGER (Jackson, Miss.), Nov. 3, 1996, at G4). It is difficult, however,
to understand how the public can make an informed decision at the polls based solely on which
candidate is more "pro-law."
140 See, e.g., Editorial, Give Judges Chance to Speak on Issues; An Appointive System
Would be Better. But If They Must Campaign, Judges Should Speak Their Minds, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESS-NEWS, Dec. 10, 2001, at 4B; Editorial, How Can Voters Judge, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Dec. 5, 2001, at B8; Editorial, Judges 'Gag Rules' Extreme,
SOUTH FLORIDA SUN-SENTINEL, Dec. 16, 2001, at 4F.
141 For example, Wisconsin Supreme Court Justice Nathan Heffeman spent $1.2 million
on his nonpartisan reelection campaign in 1999, while candidates for two Alabama Supreme
Court seats spent $2 million in 1996 in a partisan election. See ABA REPORT, supra note 24,
at 9-11.
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scribes the different variants of appointive systems. Recognizing that
appointive systems do not completely remove political influence from
judicial selection, the article recommends that states avoid adopting a
method that provides too much influence to any particular segment of
society. Finally, the article describes the likely challenges to enacting
meaningful reform and provides several examples of success. It concludes that in many of the states that elect their judges, the time is right
for moving to an appointive system.
A.

APPOINTIVE SYSTEMS PROVIDE THE APPROPRIATE BALANCE OF
INDEPENDENCE AND ACCOUNTABILITY

Proponents of judicial elections often argue that judges ought to be
held publicly accountable. In order to preserve an independent and impartial judiciary, yet ensure some public accountability, a balance must
be struck between these conflicting, but not mutually exclusive, principles. Appointive judicial selection systems strike this balance through
means that hold judges publicly accountable without unduly influencing
their day-to-day decisions.
In virtually all appointive systems, judges are nominated by a governor who must be responsive to the public. Judges are then subject to
Senate confirmation, a process that allows additional public input and
helps ensure that those appointed do not hold extreme views. In the rare
situation that an appointed judge's opinions appear wholly at odds with
the law, impeachment provides yet one more, though infrequently used,
method for the public to hold a judge accountable for his or her
decisions.
Many states with appointive systems, particularly those using merit
selection, build an additional layer of accountability into the selection of
judges through the use of "retention elections." Such elections allow
voters to decide whether or not to retain an appointed judge at the conclusion of an initial term of office. Retention elections, however, may tip
the balance between independence and impartiality, and public accountability. As further explained below, retention elections can be subject to
many of the same problems of ordinary contested elections, including the
inordinate influence of money and special interest groups, and the problem of nasty rhetoric that undermines the moral authority of the courts.
B.

OVERVIEW OF APPOINTIVE SYSTEMS

Appointive systems can generally be grouped in two categories:
pure appointive systems and merit selection. The states employ numerous variations of these systems to reflect their unique political structures,
histories, and values.
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The Pure Appointive System

The method of judicial selection most familiar to the American public is that used at the federal level. This method, a pure appointive system, has been unaltered since the founding of our nation. Under this
process, the President appoints judges subject to the advice and consent
of the Senate. 14 2 The United States Constitution provides that federal
judges "shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour" and does not
permit a reduction in their salary during their tenure. 14 3 These timetested provisions help insulate the federal judiciary from undue political
influence.
Despite the success of the federal structure, 144 not a single state employs the precise method of judicial selection used for the federal bench.
Several states, however, have adopted a method that resembles the federal system. In Maine, for example, the governor appoints judges subject
to confirmation by a legislative committee whose decision is reviewable
by the senate. 145 At the conclusion of a seven-year term, the governor
may reappoint the judge. In New Jersey, the governor appoints judges
subject to senate confirmation. 146 New Jersey judges serve an initial
47
seven-year term and then may be granted life tenure by the governor.1
Virginia appoints its judges for 12-year terms through a majority vote of
148
the members of each house of its General Assembly.
142 See U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2.
143 U.S. CONST. art. III, § I. Alexander Hamilton was a strong advocate of appointed
judges with lifetime tenure. Hamilton cautioned,
That inflexible and uniform adherence to the rights of the Constitution, and of individuals, which we perceive to be indispensable in the courts of justice, can certainly
not be expected from judges who hold their offices by a temporary commission.
Periodical appointments, however regulated, or by whomsoever made, would, in
some way or other, be fatal to their necessary independence. If the power of making
them was committed either to the executive or legislature there would be danger of
an improper complaisance to the branch which possessed it; if to both, there would
be an unwillingness to hazard the displeasure of either; if to the people, or to persons
chosen by them for the special purpose, there would be too great a disposition to
consult popularity to justify a reliance that nothing would be consulted but the Constitution and the laws.
ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST No. 78, at 441 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1987) (emphasis
added).
144 Of course, the federal system of judicial selection is not without its problems, such as
the number of unfilled vacancies due to conflicts between the parties. See The Chief Justice
Speaks, WASH. POST., Jan. 4, 2002, at A26; see also Alberto Gonzales, The Crisis in Our
Courts, WALL ST. J., Jan. 25, 2002, at A18. There has been little criticism of the federal
system, however, in terms of judicial independence and impartiality.
145 See ME. CONST. art. V, § 8.
146 See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § I.
147 See N.J. CONST. art. VI, § 3.
148 See VA. CONST. art. VI, § 7. See generally Victor E. Schwartz et al., FosteringMutual
Respect and Cooperation Between State Courts and State Legislatures: A Sound Alternative to
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Several states that elect their judges fill judicial vacancies by gubernatorial appointment until the next election. Only four states, Massachusetts, New Hampshire, New Jersey, and Rhode Island grant their judges
1 49
lifetime tenure.

2.

Merit Selection

Merit selection is a variant of the appointive system. Merit selection systems have three basic components: (1) selection of a nonpartisan
judicial nominating commission; (2) a list of judicial nominees compiled
by the commission and presented to the appointing authority, who is usually the governor;' 50 and (3) the selection and appointment of a nominee.
Typically, judges appointed through merit selection serve an initial term,
usually one or two years, before they are subject to a nonpartisan "retention election." In a retention election, voters vote either yes or no as to
whether the judge should continue serving on the bench for a full term.
At the conclusion of a full term, the judge is subject to another retention
election if he or she seeks to remain on the bench.
The American Bar Association endorsed the merit selection system
in 1937.1 5' Missouri became the first state to adopt the plan in 1940,152
hence, the merit selection system is sometimes referred to as the "Missouri Plan," although, as we will show, there is great variance between
the merit selection systems of the states. Currently, twenty-five states
and the District of Columbia use some form of merit selection system to
appoint judges to an initial term.1 53 Additionally, several states that ordia Tort Tug of War, 103 W.VA. L. REV. 1 (2000) (stating that this structure has promoted a
cooperative atmosphere between the legislature and the Virginia Supreme Court).
149 See Appendix A.
15o In Connecticut and South Carolina, the judicial nominating committee submits its recommendations directly to the legislature, which fills the position through election. See Appendix A. See generally Martin Scott Driggers, Jr., South Carolina's Experiment: Legislative
Control of JudicialMerit Selection, 49 S.C. L. Rev. 1217, 1217-18 (1998) (stating that South
Carolina recently incorporated merit selection into its legislative process after one of its most

partisan races in history).
See KEVIN C. MANNIX, JUDICIAL SELECTION IN THE UNITED STATES 5 (2000).
152 See id. at 4.
153 States employing some form of merit selection for initial terms include Alaska, Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut, Delaware, Florida, Hawaii, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Maryland,
Massachusetts, Missouri, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma,
Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Vermont, and Wyoming. California has a hybrid method of judicial selection featuring some characteristics of a pure appointive system and others of a merit system. In California, the governor appoints judges after
submitting the names of nominees to a state bar commission for evaluation of their qualifications. After receiving a confidential report from the commission, the governor has complete
discretion to appoint a judge. California judges, unlike those in a pure appointive system, are
subject to retention elections at the first general election after appointment and every twelve
years thereafter. See Appendix A.
151
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narily select judges through elections, employ a merit selection system to
54
fill judicial vacancies.1
States seeking to adopt a merit selection system have many important decisions to make. These decisions include: (1) the composition of
the nominating commission; (2) the term of commission members; (3)
who will chair the commission; (4) whether the commission must provide the governor with a minimum number of nominees; (5) whether the
governor can view the list as a mere recommendation, must choose off
the list, or may reject the list and request a new list; and (6) whether
appointees will be subject to an initial term and retention elections, and,
if so, the length of the initial and subsequent terms.
Assembling a commission that is truly nonpartisan and representative of various interests is both challenging and crucial for obtaining an
impartial, moderate judiciary. Therefore, determining the composition of
the nominating commission is a particularly delicate decision with significant implications. 155 Typically, some portion of the membership is
made up of attorneys, while others are selected from the general public.
In most systems, the governor, legislature, state bar association, and,
sometimes, the chief justice appoint some proportion of the nominating
commission's membership. The diversity of state laws on this issue is
illustrated by that of Colorado, where attorney members of the Supreme
Court Nominating Committee are appointed by the governor, attorney
general, and the chief justice of the state's supreme court.156 Some states
have put in place fairly intricate systems for selecting the membership of
nominating commissions in order to ensure nonpartisanship and impartiality through the participation of many groups.157 In addition, several
154 States employing merit selection to fill judicial vacancies states include Georgia,
Idaho, Kentucky, Minnesota (trial court), Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, North Dakota,
Oklahoma (the trial court is the only level ordinarily filled through elections), South Dakota
(trial court), and Wisconsin. See Appendix A.
155 See Maute, supra note 66, at 1234-35 (arguing that judicial nominating commissions
are often composed of those active in politics, lack minority representation, are dominated by
lawyers and business interests, and that commission decisions can reflect backroom political
deals).
156 See CoLo. CONST. art. VI, § 24(4).
157 Tennessee provides the best example of a complex appointment process for its judicial
selection commission. The Tennessee commission is composed of 15 members who serve sixyear terms. The Speaker of the Senate appoints three members from a list submitted by the
Tennessee Trial Lawyers Association, three members from a list submitted by the District
Attorney General Conference, and one non-attorney. The Speaker of the House appoints two
members from a list submitted by the Tennessee Bar Association, one member from a list
submitted by the Tennessee Defense Lawyers Association, three members from a list submitted by the Tennessee Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers, and one non-attorney.
Jointly, the speakers appoint one non-attorney member. Each group must submit three nominees for each position. The Tennessee Bar Association list cannot contain attorneys whose
principal practice area is plaintiffs' personal injury or criminal defense. See TENN. CODE ANN.
§§ 17-4-102, 17-4-106 (2001).
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states require a balance, or near balance, of the political party affiliation
58
of commission members. 1
Another important distinction between systems is the extent of the
governor's power over the commission. In systems that most strongly
protect the commission from political influence, members are appointed
for fixed, staggered terms. In those systems in which the executive has
greatest control, all members are appointed and serve at the pleasure of
59
the governor.1
The governor's power over judicial appointments also varies based
on the method of choosing a chairperson for the nominating commission.
Most states have adopted one of three methods in equal amounts. In
states such as Maryland, New Hampshire, and Utah, the governor is
granted a great deal of control over the commission through his or her
appointment of its chairperson. 160 Other states, such as Alaska, Colorado, and Wyoming place the power in the judicial branch itself and des16 1
ignate the chief justice of the state supreme court as chairperson.
Several other states, such as Missouri, New York (a state that changed
from an elected to appointive system for its highest court), and
Oklahoma seek to balance the interests already present on the commission by having the commission choose its own chairperson. 162 The New
Mexico Constitution designates the Dean of the University of New Mexico Law School as an ex-officio member and chairperson of the state's
163
judicial nominating commission.
Governors may also be limited in their appointments to those candidates whom the commission puts forward. In most states, the commission must provide the governor with a minimum number of
candidates. 164 This minimum number of candidates varies from two in
Alaska 165 to five in Maryland. 166 States also provide the governor with
different options should he or she not favor any of the nominating committee's recommendations. For instance, in most states the governor
must select a name off the list provided by the committee. In the few
states that grant the governor greater discretion, such as Florida and Ten158 See Appendix A (showing that such states include Arizona, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Idaho, Nebraska, New Mexico, New York, Oklahoma, Utah, and Vermont).
159 These states include Delaware (3-year terms at pleasure of governor), Georgia (to fill
vacancies), Massachusetts, and Wisconsin (to fill vacancies). In each of these states, the governor established the merit selection process through executive order. See id.
160 See id.
161 See id.
162 See id.
163 See N.M. CONST. art VI,

§ 35.

164 See Appendix A.
165 See ALASKA CONST. art. IV, § 5.
166 See MD. EXEC. ORDER 01.01.1999.08 (2001).
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nessee, the governor may reject the list and ask for a new list, or request
67
additional names.'
Finally, states considering adoption of a merit selection system need
to decide whether to subject their judges to an initial term in order to
evaluate their performance and build in a measure of accountability.
States could avoid the initial term and provide judges with immediate
lifetime tenure, as does Rhode Island. 168 If the state chooses to use an
initial term, as most states do, it must choose the length of the term and
how the judge might obtain a full term. Upon conclusion of the initial
term, the state may choose to extend the term through a retention election, reappointment through the same merit selection process, or simple
reappointment by the governor.
C.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR REFORM

Appointive systems, especially if they have a merit selection component, are a major improvement over the pure elective system for selecting state judges. As stated, appointive systems are not subject to the
problems inherent to an elected judiciary: the appearance of impropriety
caused by judges taking money from those who appear before them, the
threat to judicial independence resulting from a judge's dependence on
campaign contributions and party support, the reduced perception of impartiality caused by statements of judicial candidates on political or social issues, the elimination of qualified lawyers who would otherwise be
willing to serve as jurists, and the loss of public confidence caused by the
vile rhetoric of judicial campaigns. Appointive systems come in many
forms. Each has certain strengths and can be tailored to satisfy the needs
of the particular state.
The best known and most straightforward approach is the federal,
pure appointive system. This approach has served the country well for
over two centuries. The federal system does not remove all money and
politics from the selection of judges, but it substantially lessens their influence by requiring Senate confirmation of judges and spacing appointments out over several years (which often span administrations). For this
reason, Michigan Supreme Court Chief Justice Elizabeth Weaver has
proposed that Michigan change its method of selecting supreme court
justices from partisan nominations and election on a nonpartisan ballot to
a "modified federal plan."' 169 Under this plan, justices would be ap167 See, e.g., FLA CONST. art. V, § 11 (may reject list); TENN. CODE ANN. § 17-4-112
(2001) (may reject list); MAss. EXEC. ORDER 420 (may request additional names); N.H. EXEC.
ORDER 2000-9 (2000) (may request additional names).
168 R.I. CONST. Art. X, §5.
169 Hon. Elizabeth A. Weaver, A New Proposal for Improving Michigan's Method of
Selecting Supreme Court Justices, 4 MICH. S. CT. REP. (Dec. 2000).
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pointed by the governor for a non-renewable 14-year term, subject to
Senate confirmation, and one seat would come up for appointment every
two years. 170 Such a system, advocates Chief Justice Weaver, "move[s]
the selection of Justices from a battleground funded by special interests
71
to an arena of representative democracy."'
Properly developed and balanced merit selection systems may offer
an added benefit over pure appointive systems. Judges appointed
through gubernatorial appointment and Senate confirmation "exclude
1 72
every lawyer except those who have some connection to their party."'
The use of a nonpartisan judicial nominating commission, however, alleviates the need for strong party ties. In states considering use of a judicial nominating commission to select judges, it is essential that the
composition of the commission not be skewed to any one interest group,
party, or profession. For example, in several states, all of the attorney
173
members of the commission are appointed by the state bar association,
which is often dominated by personal injury lawyers. This lends results
akin to "buy me" elections. Of importance too is the unfortunate situation that some states do not require a balance between the two major
17 4
political parties.
The length of a judge's term is another important consideration in
promoting judicial independence. Life tenure, as Alexander Hamilton
recognized, 175 is the best means of assuring judicial independence. Short
of life tenure, the longer the term, the greater the potential for judicial
independence. The public's desire for accountability, however, necessitates some checks on appointed judges. Few states opt for a lifetime
appointment system because the people or the political establishment
want to be able to remove judges who lose sight of society's values. For
this reason, most states with appointive systems set a full term of be76
tween four and twelve years.'
Those states that use merit selection provide for nonpartisan retention elections that usually occur within one to two years of appointment
and after each full term. Although retention elections are simple nonpartisan, up-down votes, experience demonstrates that they are still subject
to some of the problems of contested elections. For example, California
Id.
Id.; see also Dawson Bell, Engler to Ask for Appointed High Court, DETROIT FREE
PRESS, Jan. 27, 2001 (reporting Michigan Governor John Engler's support for the Weaver plan
for an appointed Supreme Court).
172 Howard Wilkinson, Choices Rare in Judge Races, CINCINNATI ENQUIRER, Mar. 23,
170
171

2001 (quoting Bruce I. Petrie Sr., a Cincinnati lawyer and advocate for adoption of merit

selection in Ohio).
173 See Appendix A.
174 See id.
175
176

See HAMILTON, supra note 143, at 437.
See Appendix A.
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and Tennessee have hosted particularly fierce and partisan retention bat-

ties. 177 States can escape this dilemma and dispense with elections by
adopting the method used in Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, and New
York, in which judges are re-evaluated and re-appointed by the judicial
selection commission at the expiration of their terms.' 78 Similarly, in
Vermont, after appointment through merit selection, a judge receives an
additional term so long as the General Assembly does not vote against
79
continuance in office.1

While there may not be one best appointive system, the appropriate
balance between judicial independence and impartiality, and public accountability may be most closely reached through a system with the following components: (1) appointment of a judicial nominating
commission that is not skewed toward any one political party, interest
group, or school of legal thought; (2) gubernatorial appointment from a
minimum number of candidates presented by the judicial nominating
commission subject to senate confirmation; (3) staggered appointment of
judges to appellate courts; (4) terms of at least eight years; 180 (5) an
impeachment process; (6) filling of judicial vacancies through the same
method for the remainder of the departing judge's term; and (7) at the
conclusion of a term, a re-appointment process by which the judicial
nominating commission evaluates and may re-appoint the judge for an
additional term.
If the appointment process proceeds as Arizona Supreme Court Justice Stanley Feldman has described, the public should embrace it as a
sound way of promoting judicial independence:
When I was interviewed by Governor Bruce Babbitt for
appointment to the Arizona Supreme Court, he proceeded to give me a ten-minute lecture on the proper
function of judges, which, in his opinion, was to stay out
of the way of governors, and not to interfere with the
accomplishments of any program that the governor had
managed to get through the legislature. After about six
or seven minutes, he looked at me. I was sitting there
trying not to smile. While looking at me, he said, "You
177 See Hon. Harold See, Comment: JudicialSelection and Decisional Independence, 61
LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 141, 146-47 (1998); Anthony Champagne, National Summit on
Improving Judicial Selection: Political Partiesand Judicial Elections, 34 Loy. L.A. L. REV.
1411, 1420-21 (2001).
178 See CONN. GEN. STAT. § 51-44a(e)-(h); DEL. EXEC. ORDER 4 (2001); HAW. CONST.
art. IV, § 3; N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2(d).
179 See VT. CONST. § 34.
180 See THE CONSTITUTION PROJECT, UNCERTAIN JUSTICE: POLITICS AND AMERICA'S

COURTS 90-92 (2000) (discussing how longer terms promote judicial independence and recommending adoption of 8-year terms).

20021

THE CASE FOR JUDICIAL APPOINTMENTS

don't believe a word I'm saying, do you?" And I answered, "Well, I wouldn't put it that way, Governor,
but. ..." He stopped me, and said, "You're not going to
do what I'm telling you, you're going to do what you
t
think is right." I replied, "Yes, I am."'
D.

CHALLENGES OF MOVING FROM AN ELECTED TO APPOINTIVE

SYSTEM

Despite the many problems of elective judicial systems, states seeking to make changes may face difficult challenges, including: significant
cultural and constitutional hurdles to reform. 1 82 Both history and the recent experiences of Missouri, Rhode Island and New York, however,
provide confidence that meaningful reform can become a reality. A state
need not wait until its next judicial scandal. The strong public policy
favoring appointive systems and negative public reaction to judicial campaigns may provide the impetus for change.
1. Cultural Impediments to Reform
One impediment to states wishing to move from an elected to an
appointive system is the ingrained belief among many in the public that
83
elections are simply the best method of selecting public officials.
Lawrence Landskroner, an Ohio attorney, exemplified this conviction
when he stated that "Proponents of [merit selection] assume that the voting public is incapable of selecting qualified judges .... This is a dangerous and undemocratic premise that would place the selection of
judges in the hands of a privileged few."' 18 4 Americans regard elections
181 Hon. Stanley Feldman, Does Tort Reform Threaten Judicial Independence?, 31 SETON
HALL L. REv. 666, 668 (2001).
182 Judicial reform efforts have failed in several states. See, e.g., Wilkinson, supra note
172 (noting that 65 percent of Ohio voters voted against a constitutional amendment for merit
selection in 1987); Maddox, supra note 3, at 335-41 (detailing several failed attempts at judicial selection reform over the past century in Alabama); See Grimes, supra note 22, at 2304-08

(discussing failed attempt to move from partisan elections to merit selection in North Carolina
since 1991); Howard Troxler, Merit-based Selections Didn't Fly, Rightly So, ST. PETERSBURG

TIMES, Nov. 20, 2000, at lB (reporting that voters in each judicial circuit in Florida overwhelmingly voted to reject changing from an elective to an appointive system of judicial elections in November of 2000); Lawrence Landskroner, An Unmeritorious Way to Select Judges,

(Cleveland, Ohio), Jan. 29, 1994, at 7B (arguing in opposition to appointive
systems and noting that voters twice rejected a constitutional amendment to move to merit
selection).
PLAIN DEALER

183

See, e.g., Jeffrey D. Jackson, The Selection of Judges in Kansas: A Comparison of

Systems, 69 J. JAN. B.A. 32, 32 (2000) (noting that a recent survey found that approximately
63% of Kansas citizens favored election of trial judges and 54% favored election of appellate
court judges over gubernatorial appointment). More than three quarters of judges and lawyers,
however, favored gubernatorial appointment over elections. See id. at n.4.
184 Landskroner, supra note 182, at 7B.
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as a critical part of the democracy that they hold dear and they are not
willing to sacrifice their "right to vote" without a fight. 185 If one asks a
random member of the public whether judges should be elected or appointed, the default answer is probably "elected, of course." The public
may also feel that selecting judges via appointment rather than elections
will simply shift the politics of judicial selection from an open process to
a smoky backroom.18 6 Overcoming this attitude will be especially difficult because the selection system of most of these states has been in
place for the past 150 years. Simple inertia may supply the greatest enemy of meaningful change.
2.

ConstitutionalHurdles

Abandoning the elected system of judicial selection also will require
more than a simple act of a state legislature in most states. The method
of judicial selection is specified in many state constitutions. Constitutional change frequently requires the support of a super-majority of the
legislature and direct public approval through a ballot initiative. For example, constitutional change in Texas, a state that selects its judges
through partisan elections, requires that the legislature approve a proposed amendment by a two-thirds majority of all members elected to
87
each house and a majority of the public vote to effectuate the change.'
E.

EXPERIENCE PROVES THAT THE CHALLENGE CAN BE OVERCOME

1. Historically, Appointive Systems are the Norm
Contrary to popular belief, judicial elections are not firmly rooted in
our nation's history. Indeed, judicial elections were "virtually unheard
of' until the early nineteenth century. 188 In fact, all of the original thirteen states appointed members of the judiciary. 189 At the time de Tocqueville observed our government systems elected judiciaries were a
recent innovation in the trial courts arising out of the wildfire spread of
Jacksonian democracy. 190 Prior to New York's adoption of an elected
185 On June 27, 2000, voters in the District of Columbia, narrowly approved a referendum
to replace an I I-member elected school board with a board composed of five elected and four
appointed members. Approval of this referendum demonstrates that even a city determined to
obtain elected representation is willing to sacrifice elected offices for higher quality government. The divisiveness of the election, which pitted residents along racial, geographical, and
political lines, also demonstrates the challenge of obtaining such reform. See Justin Blum &
Michael H. Cottman, D.C. School Referendum Splits Voters; Board Makeup Hinges on Uncounted Ballots, WASH. POST, June 28, 2000, at Al.
186 See Maute, supra note 66, at 1234-35.
187 See TEX. CoNsT. art. XVII, § 1.
188 Maute, supra note 66, at 1201.
189 See Shapiro, supra note 37, at 671.
190 See KEVIN C. MANNIX, supra note 151, at 4. The appointive system came under

attack in the mid-nineteenth century because the public felt that property owners controlled the
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system in 1846, the Governor appointed nearly all state court judges. 19'
Between 1846 and 1860, 19 of the 21 states approved constitutions providing for the election of judges, 92 and all of the states admitted to the
union thereafter provided for judicial elections. 193 Today, seven states
retain partisan elections and thirteen states retain nonpartisan elections
for selecting judges for their courts of appellate and general
94
jurisdiction. 1
2.

Reform in Missouri, New York and Rhode Island Prove That
Change is Possible

Voters in Missouri, New York, and Rhode Island have chosen to
eliminate the negative aspects of judicial elections through adoption of
merit selection systems. Their experience demonstrates that judicial selection reform can occur in other states.
Ironically, Missouri, one of the few states to elect its judges prior to
the Jacksonian populist movement, was the first state to replace judicial
elections with an appointive selection system. 95 In 1940, Missouri voters were fed up with the perceived hijacking of the judiciary by the political parties, particularly by the Pendergast machine. In that year, voters
adopted a constitutional amendment providing for merit appointment of
196
judges in Kansas City, St. Louis, and the Missouri appellate courts.
In 1977, New York, the state that instigated the nationwide movement from appointive to elected systems 150 years earlier, returned to an
appointive system for selecting judges for its highest court.197 New York
voters adopted a constitutional amendment eliminating judicial elections
for the Court of Appeals of New York for the precise reasons that support reform in other states: increasingly expensive elections and the recognition that the electorate lacked adequate knowledge to make an
informed decision due to limitations placed on judicial speech.1 98 New
judiciary. See id. The movement to elective systems may have also resulted from the public's
discontent with the perceived elitism of judges. See Maute, supra note 66, at 1203-04.
191 See ROBERT W. BOATRIGHT, AM. JUDICATURE SOC., THE CONTINUING EFFORT TO CREATE A NONPARTISAN JUDICIARY IN THE STATE COURTS 12 (2001). Mississippi became the first

state to provide for direct election of appellate judges in 1832.
192 See Kermit L. Hall, The Judiciary on Trial: ConstitutionalReform and the Rise of an

Elected Judiciary 1846-1860, 46

THE HISTORIAN

193

See Croley, supra note 86, at 716-17.

194

See Appendix A.

195

See

BOATRIGHT,

337 (1983).

supra note 191, at 13.

See id, at 14.
197 See N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 2.
198 See George Bundy Smith, Choosing Judgesfor a State's Highest Court, 48
L. Rnv. 1493, 1494 (1998).
196

SYRACUSE
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York voters chose to adopt a merit selection system to eliminate politics
from the selection process and preserve judicial independence. 199
Most recently, Rhode Island completely abandoned its elective system and replaced it with a merit system. 2° ° Prior to 1994, Rhode Island
Supreme Court justices were elected by the state's General Assembly in
Grand Committee. 20 The governor appointed lower court judges subject
to Senate confirmation. 20 2 In 1994, Rhode Island voters approved a constitutional amendment authorizing the Governor to appoint supreme
court justices from a list of names submitted by a nonpartisan nominating

committee.2 0 3 The legislature adopted an identical process by statute for
selection of lower court judges. 20 4 Reform in Rhode Island was preceded by a newspaper investigation into the court system that alleged
"the disappearance of money from a court fund and the growth of pa20° 5
tronage and cronyism within the court.
3.

Momentum is Buildingfor Change

Momentum for reform is building in several states. For example,
the nonprofit organization Pennsylvanians for Modern Courts is actively
promoting reform of Pennsylvania's judicial system. 20 6 The group's efforts recently received a boost when departing Pennsylvania Governor
(now Director of the United States Office of Homeland Security) Tom
Ridge, in his farewell address to the general assembly, stated: "I am
proud to stand with those who believe that our court system can be made
even better if we change the way we select our judges. And I think most
people agree. But to those who do not, I say-live up to your words. If
199 See id.
200 See generally Michael J. Yelnosky, Rhode Island's Judicial Nominating Commission:
Can "Reform" Become Reality?, 1 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 87, 89 (1996); Barton P.
Jenks, III, Rhode Island's New Judicial Merit Selection Law, I ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV.
63, 64 (1996). In 1998, Florida voters overwhelmingly approved an amendment to the state's
constitution to provide voters in each county the option of replacing the nonpartisan election of
trial court judges with a merit selection system. See Martha W. Barnett, The 1997-98 Florida
Constitution Revision Commission: Judicial Election or Merit Selection, 52 FLA. L. REV. 411,
412 (2000). The Florida Constitution already provided for the appointment of appellate court
judges. See id. at 413.
201 See Jenks, supra note 200, at 65.
202 See id. (citing repealed statutory provisions).
203 See R.I. CONST. art. X, § 5.
204 See R.I. GEN. LAWS § 8-16.1-7.
205 Scott Lindlaw, Ocean State Trying to Shed Reputation for Political Sleaze, Assoc.
PRESS, Apr. 16, 1994. The scandal ultimately ended in the resignation of Rhode Island Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas Fay. See id; see also Yelnosky, supra note 200, at 89
("[Justice Fay] was the second consecutive chief justice of the Supreme Court of Rhode Island
to resign in the face of allegations of official misconduct.").
206 See Ellen Mattleman Kaplan, Blueprint for the Future of Judicial Selection Reform,
(Pennsylvanians for Modem Courts, July 1999) at http://www.pmconline.org (last visited Jan.
15, 2002).
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you truly believe in the voters-let them decide! Approve a referendum
on merit selection. 20 7 Nonprofit organizations in Texas and Ohio have
mounted strong campaigns based on empirical research suggesting that
judicial elections influence decisionmaking. 20 8 In Arizona, a state that
adopted a merit selection system for most of its judges in 1974,209 sup2 10
port is building to extend the plan to trial courts in rural counties.
In addition, several prominent editorial boards have strongly advocated for a change from an elected to appointive system. 21 Law journals
also are replete with articles condemning various state systems of judicial
2 12
elections and stressing the need for a change to an appointive system.
Other advocates for change include prominent members of the judiciary
who have elections to thank for their own positions. 2 1 3 For example, in
Michigan, a proposal by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court to move
207 Address by Governor Tom Ridge, Farewell Speech to the General Assembly, Oct. 2,
2001 available at http://sites.state.pa.us/PAExec/Govemor/Speeches/01 1002.htm (last visited
Jan. 15, 2002).
208 See TEXANS FOR PUB. JUST., PAY TO PLAY, (2001) at http://www.tpj.org/reportsl
paytoplay/ (last visited January 15, 2002); N.E. OHIO AM. FRIENDS SERV. COMM., OHIO SUPREME COURT JUSTICE FOR SALE (1999), available at http://www.afsc.net/l_b_5.htm (last visited Jan. 15, 2002).
209 In 1992, Arizona voters approved an amendment to its constitution revising its merit
selection system. The changes expanded the membership of the judicial nominating commissions, added requirements that the commissions hear public testimony and vote in public
before making recommendations to the Governor, and mandated that the commissions and the
Governor consider the diversity of the state or county's population in making nominations and
appointments. See Ariz. Prop. 109 (1992).
210 See Editorial, Picking JPs on Merit is Only Sane Approach, ARIz. REPUBLIC, Nov. 26,
2001.
211 See, e.g., Editorial, Limits on Campaigning Show Flaw in Electing Judges, NEWSDAY,
Dec. 10, 2001, at A26; Editorial, Give Judges Chance to Speak on Issues; An Appointive
System Would be Better. Bu If They Must Campaign, Judges Should Speak Their Minds, SAN
ANTONIO EXPRESs-NEws, Dec. 10, 2001, at 4B; Editorial, How Can Voters Judge?, PLAIN
DEALER (Cleveland, Ohio), Dec. 5, 2001, at B8; Courting Disaster;PartisanElections Almost
Guarantee Some Poor Judges, HOUSTON CHRON., July 27, 2001, at A34; Editorial, Once
More, With Feeling, CINCINNATI POST, Nov. 13, 2000, at 10A; CorruptingInfluences Grow in
Contests for Judgeships, USA TODAY, Nov. 2, 2000, at 16A (discussing judicial elections in
Michigan, Ohio, North Carolina, and Alabama); Marty Trillhaase, Editorial, Judicial Race
Standards Needed, IDAHO FALLS POST REGISTER, Oct. 31, 2000, at A6; Editorial, Judicial
Races, MIssIssIPPI CLARION-LEDGER, Oct. 13, 2000; Higher Ground Group Wants Better Conduct from Judicial Candidates,BIRMINGHAM NEWS, Sept. 21, 2000.
212 See, e.g., Barnett, supra note 200; Grimes, supra note 22; Croley, supra note 86.
213 See, e.g., Hon. Thomas J. Moyer, Address at the State of the Judiciary for the 124th
Sess. of the Ohio Gen. Assembly (Mar. 20, 2001) available at http://www.sconet.state.oh.us/
Communications_office/Speeches/2001/2001soj.asp (last visited Dec. 24, 2001); Doug
Oplinger, Top Ohio Jurist Backs Election Reforms, AKRON BEACON J., Jan. 2, 2001 (reporting
that Supreme Court Chief Justice Thomas Moyer held a press conference to announce his
support for placing a constitutional amendment on the ballot to allow for appointment of
judges rather than election); Weaver, supra note 169; Maddox, supra note 3; Hon. Thomas R.
Phillips, Comment, Judicial Independence and Accountability, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.
127 (1998); Hon. Clifford W. Taylor, Who's In Charge: A Traditional View of Separation of
Powers, 1997 DETROIT C.L. MICH. ST. U. L. REV. 769, 774 (1997).
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to an appointive system received the support of the governor and has
been introduced as a constitutional amendment in the state senate. 2 14 A
similar proposal was passed by the Texas Senate with the support of the
2 15
Chief Justice of the Texas Supreme Court in 2001.
The United States Supreme Court's expected ruling in Republican
Party of Minnesota v. Kelly 2 16 may also build momentum for change
from elective to appointive systems. On March 26, 2002, members of
the Court expressed skepticism of restrictions on judicial candidate
'2 17
speech and suggested that judicial elections "may be a very bad idea."
Justice Scalia commented that he was "befuddled that Minnesota wants
its judges elected but then enacts a provision intended to prevent voters
from knowing how they'll behave on the bench. '21 8 Should the court
strike down Minnesota's restrictions on the speech of judicial candidates,
some previous advocates of judicial "elections" may find that they cannot stomach true, free judicial elections on par with the competitiveness,
rhetoric, attacks, partisanship, and promises of other political campaigns.
As Professor John Echeverria of the Georgetown University Law Center
recognized, the case provides the justices with the opportunity to encourage merit selection by telling Minnesota, "You can't restrict judicial
speech of candidates in order to preserve judicial independence because
you can achieve the same objective without infringing the First
2 19
Amendment."
214 See Mich. S.J.R. F, Reg. Session (Introduced Feb. 1, 2001) available at http:H
198.109.173.12/mileg.asp?page=getobject&objname=2001 -SJ-o2-004; Press Release, Senator
Ken Sikkema, Sen. Sikkema Calls for Appointment of Supreme Court Justices (Jan. 30, 2001)
(on file with author), available at http://www.senate.state.mi.us/gop/news/sikkema/releases/
13001.pdf; Bell, supra note 171 (reporting Michigan Governor John Engler's support for the
Supreme Court Chief Justice Weaver's plan for an appointed Supreme Court); Weaver, supra
note 169. As of April 1, 2002, no action has been taken on the joint resolution. It has eleven
co-sponsors and has been referred to the Senate Committee on Government Operations.
215 See Tex. S.J.R. 3 (Introduced Feb. 26, 2001), available at http://
www.capitol.state.tx.us/sjrnl/77r/html/2-26.htm. As introduced, the Texas proposal provided
for gubernatorial appointment with Senate confirmation of appellate court justices and judges
for 6-year terms followed by a non-partisan retention election. The substitute bill approved by
the Senate on April 25, 2001, eliminated retention elections in favor of gubernatorial re-appointment. In the Texas House of Representatives, the bill was reported favorably out of the
Judicial Affairs Committee, but was not considered on the floor before the end of the session.
216 247 F.3d 854 (8th Cir. 2001), cert. granted, 122 S. Ct. 643 (2001); Charles Lane,
Supreme Court to Review Campaign Rules, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 2001, at A5.
217 Linda Greenhouse, Supreme Court Weighs Rule Limiting Judicial Candidates'
Speech, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 27, 2002, at A20 (quoting Justice Antonin Scalia).
218 Charles Lane, Justices Wary of State Judge Election Rules, WASH. POST, Mar. 27,
2002, at A04.
219 Marcia Coyle, U.S. Supreme Court Eyes Limits in State Judicial Races, NAT'L L. J.,
Mar. 25, 2002, at A 1. Professor Echeverria filed an amicus brief on behalf of environmental
groups in support of neither party emphasizing the growing conflict between judicial independence and popular election of judges and requesting that the Court decide the case "in light of
the broader problem of the politicization of the state court systems, including the serious ques-
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V.

CONCLUSION

The method of judicial selection used by a majority of states at
some level is in dire need of reform. All evidence suggests that the
money and rhetoric involved in judicial campaigns is spiraling out of
control. With each passing election, public confidence in the integrity
and impartiality of the courts falls lower. Quick fixes, such as contribution limits and restrictions on freedom of speech, are not the answer.
Rather, they serve to illustrate the fundamental conflict between popular
elections and the role of the judiciary as an impartial arbiter of individual
cases and controversies. The founding fathers got it right the first time judges should be appointed, not elected. A few states have returned to
appointive systems and, whether they adopted pure appointive or merit
selection systems, they have not changed their view that appointive judicial selection systems provide the best means of ensuring judicial independence. Other states should follow this path to sounder, fairer justice.
We appreciate that cultural and other hurdles may make the change
to appointive judicial selection systems difficult to achieve. People may
decide they prefer the public accountability that comes with judicial elections, despite the threat elective systems pose to judicial independence,
among other serious problems. Nevertheless, reform is worth pursuing
in order to improve the public's perception of the nation's judiciary and
maintain the moral authority of the courts. At a minimum, states should
put the issue to voters and let them decide.

tions about whether litigants are being denied their due process rights to fair and impartial
courts." See Brief Amicus Curiae of the Idaho Conservation League and the Louisiana Environmental Action Network in Support of Neither Side, Republican Party of Minnesota v.
Kelly, 2002 WL 100586 (U.S. Jan. 17, 2002) (No. 01-521).
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